WHEN A MONEY TRANSFER FROM ABROAD IS CAUGHT IN A MASAK INVESTIGATION IN TURKEY: BANK ACCOUNT BLOCK AND THE LEGAL APPLICATION PROCESS

WHAT IS MASAK IN TURKEY AND WHAT POWERS DOES IT HAVE?

MASAK is the Financial Crimes Investigation Board operating within the Ministry of Treasury and Finance. This administrative unit, which Article 2 of Law No. 5549 on the Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime defines in short as “the Presidency”, is Turkey’s national central financial intelligence unit (Financial Intelligence Unit – FIU) in combating the laundering of proceeds of crime (money laundering) and the financing of terrorism.

1. The Legal Character of MASAK and the Limits of Its Duties in Turkey

The biggest mistake made in practice is perceiving MASAK as a criminal investigation authority or a judicial law enforcement unit. Under Turkish law, MASAK’s legal status and field of duty lie within the following limits:

• It has no power to investigate or to file an indictment: MASAK is not a law enforcement body or a prosecution unit. It does not carry out a criminal investigation itself, it cannot apply the measure of detention or arrest, it cannot draw up an indictment and it cannot impose a criminal penalty.
• It is a financial intelligence and analysis authority: Its basic duty is to analyse the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) coming from obliged parties (banks, payment institutions, notaries public, crypto asset service providers and so on) and the public and private sector data it can access itself.
• It sets the judicial mechanism in motion: Where the analyses carried out reveal reasonable indications that proceeds of crime exist or that there is a suspicion of laundering, the matter is recorded in a Laundering Investigation Report and sent to the competent Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. In this respect MASAK is an administrative preliminary review and reporting authority that starts the criminal process in the Turkish legal system.

2. What Powers Does MASAK Have Under Law No. 5549 in Turkey?

MASAK is equipped with a broad power to collect information and to take administrative measures in order to secure the transparency of the financial system.

• • Power to request information and documents (Arts. 6 & 7): Public institutions, banks, financial institutions and natural and legal persons are obliged to provide any information, document and record requested by MASAK without taking refuge in commercial or professional secrecy.
  • Power to postpone / suspend suspicious transactions (Art. 19/A): Where financial transactions carry a suspicion of laundering or of financing terrorism, or there are reasonable grounds that they derive from assets connected with those offences, MASAK has the power, with the approval of the Minister of Treasury and Finance, to suspend or postpone them for 7 business days.
  • Power of on-site supervision and examination (Art. 11): Through tax inspectors, customs inspectors, sworn bank auditors and BRSA experts it may have on-site supervision and a laundering examination carried out at the obliged parties.

WHERE DOES MASAK OBTAIN ITS INFORMATION IN TURKEY?

MASAK’s basic data source in its financial intelligence gathering and analysis work is the “obliged parties” listed in Article 2 of Law No. 5549 on the Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime.

These actors, which sit at the key points of the financial system and of commercial life, bear administrative and criminal liability for preventing the laundering of assets that are the subject of an offence.

1. Which Institutions Are Obliged to Provide Information to MASAK in Turkey?

Under Turkish legislation, the main obliged parties that must monitor financial movements, carry out identification and report suspicious situations are the following:

• Financial institutions and banks: Deposit and participation banks, capital market intermediary institutions, portfolio management companies, insurance and reinsurance companies.
• The payment and digital finance sector: Payment institutions, electronic money institutions (FinTech) and crypto asset service providers (crypto exchanges).
• Members of the independent professions and intermediaries: Notaries public, jewellers, real estate advisers/estate agencies and, under certain conditions, independent accountant financial advisers (SMMM) and sworn-in financial advisers (YMM).

2. What Are the Core Obligations of Banks and Other Obliged Parties in Turkey?

Law No. 5549 places two main legal duties on obliged institutions in combating proceeds of crime:

1. The duty to know the customer (Law No. 5549, Art. 3 / Know Your Customer – KYC): Before a permanent business relationship is established, or in transactions exceeding certain monetary thresholds, obliged parties must identify the persons carrying out the transaction, the third parties on whose behalf they act and the real beneficiary (Ultimate Beneficial Owner). Where the documents submitted in this framework are forged or contradictory, this is a ground for stopping the transaction.
2. The duty to file a suspicious transaction report (Law No. 5549, Art. 4 / Suspicious Transaction Report – STR): Where there is any information, suspicion or matter requiring suspicion that the assets subject to a transaction carried out or attempted before an obliged party have been obtained by unlawful means or are being used for unlawful purposes, the matter is immediately reported to MASAK.

Under the confidentiality requirement (Art. 4/2), obliged parties may in no way disclose to the customer who is party to the transaction, or to third parties, that they have filed a suspicious transaction report with MASAK. For this reason banks operating under Turkish law, instead of telling a customer whose account has been stopped “we have filed a report with MASAK”, generally give the reason as “a compliance restriction or a document review”.

IS A SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORT NOTIFIED TO THE PERSON IN TURKEY?

A suspicious transaction report is not notified to the person. It is not legally possible for a suspicious transaction report (STR) to be communicated or notified to the person carrying out the transaction or to the holder of the account.

1. Why Is Confidentiality Essential in a Suspicious Transaction Report in Turkey?

In practice, the main legal reason why people whose money from abroad has been held up receive vague and evasive answers at bank branches such as “there is a restriction in the system”, “the Head Office Compliance Unit is reviewing it” or “there is a technical situation” is the absolute rule of confidentiality in Article 4, paragraph 2 of Law No. 5549.

Law No. 5549, Art. 4/2: “Obliged parties may not disclose that a suspicious transaction report has been filed with the Presidency to anyone, including the parties to the transaction, other than the supervisory staff assigned to audit compliance and the courts during proceedings.”

The purpose of this mandatory provision is to prevent the person under investigation from tampering with the evidence, from moving the funds out of the system or from learning of the situation before judicial or administrative measures are applied. Bank staff or obliged parties who breach this duty and inform the customer face judicial and administrative sanctions under Turkish law.

2. Does Keeping a Suspicious Transaction Report Confidential Block the Right to Seek Justice in Turkey?

The fact that the suspicious transaction report and MASAK’s preliminary review are conducted confidentially does not mean that the person reported on, or whose account has been restricted, is left entirely defenceless in legal terms.

Within the framework of the freedom to seek justice guaranteed by Article 36 of the Turkish Constitution:

• According to the nature of the restriction applied (an administrative restriction by the bank, a suspension of the transaction ordered by the Minister of Treasury and Finance or a judicial seizure),
• directly before the bank’s Compliance Unit, MASAK or the competent judicial authorities (the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office / the Criminal Judgeship of Peace),

it is possible, by operating the administrative and judicial application mechanisms that suit the features of the particular case, to have the restriction lifted and the funds released.

WHICH LEGISLATION IS A MASAK INVESTIGATION BASED ON IN TURKEY?

The taking of a money transfer from abroad into a review and the restriction that follows rest not on a single legal provision but on a hierarchy of norms in anti-money laundering law in Turkey that work together. In practice, whether the process will be an administrative compliance (Compliance) restriction, an administrative suspension decision or a judicial seizure measure depends on which of these norms comes into play.

1. What Are the Legal Bases of a MASAK Review in Turkey?

The statutory and administrative rules that form the basis of the process under anti-money laundering regulations in Turkey are the following:

• Law No. 5549 on the Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime: This is the main normative source of the obliged parties’ identification duty (Art. 3) and suspicious transaction reporting duty (Art. 4) and of the power of the Minister of Treasury and Finance to postpone transactions (Art. 19/A).
• The Regulation on the Postponement of Transactions within the Scope of the Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism (Official Gazette 29/07/2016-29785): It governs the manner in which the postponement of transactions ordered under Art. 19/A of Law No. 5549 is notified to banks, the calculation of the periods and the principles of administrative operation.
• The Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (CCP): Where the review passes to the judicial stage, this code contains the procedural provisions on seizure measures over bank accounts and assets (Art. 128) and on the suspension regime specific to cybercrime (Art. 128/A).
• Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 (TPC) Art. 282: “Laundering of Assets Derived from Crime” This is the underlying criminal norm defining the offence and the criminal sanctions attached to it.
• Administrative Jurisdiction Procedure Law No. 2577: This lays down the procedure for actions for annulment before the administrative courts brought against MASAK postponement decisions, which are individual administrative acts.
• Constitution Art. 35: This is the guarantee of the right to property. It is the constitutional limit that tests whether the restrictions and blocks imposed comply with the principles of proportionality and reasonableness.

2. What Is the Legal Basis of the Restriction Placed on a Bank Account in Turkey?

Among the rules of the legislation, the most critical provision that directly prevents a transfer from taking place or an account from being used at the administrative stage is Article 19/A added to Law No. 5549:

Law No. 5549, Art. 19/A – Postponement of Transactions:

Where there is suspicion that transactions attempted before or through obliged parties, or transactions already in progress, are connected with the offence of laundering or of financing terrorism, the Minister is empowered, in order to confirm that suspicion, to analyse it or to convey the results of the analysis to the competent authorities, to suspend them for seven business days or not to allow those transactions to take place.

A postponement decision given under this article is an administrative measure and is valid for a maximum of 7 business days. Within this period MASAK completes its analysis and either closes the file (the restriction is lifted) or refers it to the relevant Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office so that a judicial seizure measure can be applied.

WHY IS MONEY COMING FROM ABROAD TAKEN INTO A MASAK INVESTIGATION IN TURKEY?

The way the provisions of the legislation are applied to the particular case and the attitude taken by the bank change directly according to the administrative or judicial stage the review has reached.

1- When Is a Suspicious Transaction Report Filed Under Law No. 5549 in Turkey?

The perception widespread in the sector and among the public that “transfers below a certain amount do not get caught by supervision” does not match the legal reality. The Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) duty laid down in Article 4 of Law No. 5549 is not tied to any monetary threshold.

Under Turkish law, the statutory criterion is, regardless of the amount of the transaction, the existence of a suspicion that the assets are of unlawful origin or are being used for unlawful purposes. Accordingly:

1. A high-value commercial transfer whose economic and legal justification is fully documented may pass supervision without any problem,
2. even a modest, low-value transfer whose reason for sending cannot be explained or which arouses suspicion may be made the subject of a report by the system.

2- Which Transactions Carry a Risk of Review in Cross-Border Money Transfers in Turkey?

Before the banks’ compliance (Compliance) algorithms and MASAK risk analysis models, the main concrete facts that make a transfer from abroad suspicious under Turkish law and start the review process are the following:

1. 1. No connection and no economic justification: There is no known, documentable commercial or family legal relationship between the sender and the recipient (an invoice, a contract, descent, a donation and so on).
   2. Mismatch with the customer profile: The amount of the transfer is clearly out of proportion with the professional activity, turnover or known income profile that the account holder has declared to the bank.
   3. An inadequate SWIFT description: The description (Remittance Information) field in the SWIFT/SEPA message is left blank, vague wording is entered or it contradicts the supporting document, such as “Transfer” or “Payment”.
   4. Systematic transit movements (layering): The money coming from abroad is withdrawn in cash on the day it reaches the account or within a very short time, or is broken up and transferred to several different third-party accounts.
   5. High-risk geographies and intermediary institutions: The funds have been routed from countries kept on the FATF grey/black list, from geographies under sanctions or through payment institutions/crypto exchanges with weak supervision standards.

3- On What Conditions Does MASAK’s Power to Postpone a Transaction Depend in Turkey?

Because the power to postpone transactions laid down in Article 19/A of Law No. 5549 is an exceptional administrative measure that limits the right to property in the fight against proceeds of crime, it has been tied to strict statutory conditions of form and time.

A. What Are the Limits of the Power to Postpone Transactions in Turkey?

• The competent authority (the Minister of Treasury and Finance): The decision on the measure cannot be taken directly by MASAK. The Presidency only makes a proposal following technical analysis and assessment; the postponement decision is given by the Minister of Treasury and Finance in person.
• A strict time limit (a maximum of 7 business days): Under the statutory rule, the suspension period is strictly limited to 7 business days. That article contains no provision allowing this period to be extended by an administrative decision. If at the end of the 7 business days there is no seizure order given by the judicial authorities, the administrative restriction falls away automatically.
• The limit of purpose and proportionality: The statutory purpose of the measure is solely to confirm the suspicion, to analyse the funds or to convey the results of the analysis to the competent Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. Keeping the funds blocked indefinitely beyond that purpose is contrary to the right to property and to the principle of proportionality under Article 35 of the Constitution.

B. What Are the Sources That Give Rise to a Postponement Decision in Turkey?

The Regulation on the Postponement of Transactions within the Scope of the Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism sets out in three categories the channels through which the postponement mechanism may be triggered.

1. A report by the obliged party with a request for postponement: Where the suspicion of laundering intensifies in a transaction that a bank or another financial obliged party is about to carry out or that is in progress, they forward the matter to MASAK together with a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) and a request for postponement.
2. A finding made by the Presidency itself: During the routine or periodic financial screening carried out by MASAK analysts, transactions linked causally with proceeds of crime are placed on the postponement agenda on the Presidency’s own initiative.
3. A request by a foreign counterpart body: Within the framework of international cooperation, official requests from the financial intelligence units (FIU) of foreign countries for a postponement on accounts in Turkey are assessed in this context.

4- How Is the Suspension of a Bank Account Applied in Cybercrime Cases in Turkey?

Article 128/A (Official Gazette: 25/12/2025 – No. 33118), added to the Code of Criminal Procedure by Article 22 of Law No. 7571, has brought the financial system an entirely new regime of protective measures at both the doctrinal and the practical level as regards bank account restrictions and blocks.

That rule provides for a hybrid suspension mechanism entirely independent of the administrative MASAK postponement decisions and of the classic judicial seizure regime under CCP Art. 128.

1. In Which Offences Is the Account Suspension Measure Under CCP Art. 128/A Applied?

The biggest legal mistake frequently made in practice is the belief that CCP Art. 128/A can be applied to every kind of suspicious transaction or type of offence. The legislature has defined the scope of this measure as limited (exhaustively) to three specific cyber/financial offence types:

• Aggravated theft committed through the use of information systems (TPC Art. 142/2-e)
• Aggravated fraud committed by using information systems or banks or credit institutions as a tool (TPC Art. 158/1-f and l)
• Misuse of bank or credit cards (TPC Art. 245)

The legal consequence: A money transfer from abroad that falls outside these three offence types (for example suspicions of laundering arising from tax evasion, customs smuggling or non-cyber predicate offences) cannot be suspended on the basis of CCP Art. 128/A.

2. How Does the Account Suspension and Seizure Process Work in Turkey?

CCP Art. 128/A gives the investigating authorities and financial institutions a power that is extremely fast and tied to strict time limits.

• The 48-hour initial power of measure given to obliged parties: Where there is reasonable suspicion of a cybercrime, banks, payment and electronic money institutions and crypto asset service providers have the power to suspend the account in question directly for up to 48 hours.
• A prosecutor’s order where delay is prejudicial: After suspending the account, the public prosecutor may issue a written seizure order. The prosecutor’s written seizure order is submitted within 24 hours for the approval of the Criminal Judgeship of Peace.
• The judge’s decision and the period after which the measure lapses: The judge announces the decision within 48 hours of the seizure. The period starts not at the moment the prosecutor’s request reaches the judgeship but at the moment the seizure is carried out. If the judge does not announce a decision within that period, the seizure lapses automatically and the restriction on the account is lifted at once.

3. How Is an Objection Made Against an Account Suspension in Turkey?

An account holder whose account has been suspended under CCP Art. 128/A, or their lawyer, does not have to wait for the administrative processes to be completed.

Where the account holder applies to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office against the suspension and asks for the restriction to be lifted, the public prosecutor is required, within 24 hours, to give a decision accepting or rejecting the request.

Because the rule is relatively new as at its date of entry into force, no settled case law of the Court of Cassation has yet developed. For judicial blocks established before that date, or that do not fall within these three offence types, the legal basis remains the general seizure provisions of the CCP (CCP Art. 128).

HOW IS THE SOURCE OF A RESTRICTION ON A BANK ACCOUNT IDENTIFIED IN TURKEY?

The legal mistake that causes the most loss of rights and waste of time in practice is all restrictions or blocks on the account being labelled, on hearsay, a “MASAK block”.

Yet the same practical result (not being able to use the money/not being able to access the account) arises from three different legal regimes under Turkish law. The supervising authorities, legal characters, objection procedures and mandatory application periods of these regimes are entirely different from one another.

1- What Is a Transaction Restriction Placed by the Bank’s Compliance Unit in Turkey?

In order to discharge the administrative and criminal liability arising from Law No. 5549 and from the BRSA rules, banks have set up their own Compliance Units for AML compliance in Turkey.

Where, in a transfer from abroad, the bank’s Compliance Unit sees a mismatch between the income profile declared by the customer and the amount of the transfer, where the description of the transfer is inadequate or where the source of funds cannot be evidenced, it will hold the transaction or restrict the account temporarily until the information and documents are provided.

• It does not rest on a public decision: This type of restriction does not yet rest on a blocking decision given by an official public authority (MASAK, the prosecutor’s office or a court). Its legal source is the bank’s own internal risk/compliance policies and the terms of the Banking Services Agreement concluded between the parties.
• The bank itself is the counterparty: For a solution, no application is made to the judicial authorities or to MASAK. The counterparty is the Compliance Unit and Operations Centre of the bank where the transfer took place or where the account is held.
• It is the type of restriction resolved fastest: Where supporting documents showing the legal and economic justification of the transaction and the source of funds (Source of Funds) are prepared and submitted consistently and in full, the restriction is lifted by the bank itself, with no need for a judicial or administrative decision.
• Its strategic importance: At this stage the written defence and the index of documents submitted to the bank are extremely critical. Contradictory or inadequate statements given here cause the bank to file a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) and pass the file straight to MASAK and to the judicial authorities.

2- How Is a Postponement of a Transaction Originating with MASAK Recognised in Turkey?

The postponement based on Article 19/A of Law No. 5549 is an administrative act resting on the approval of the Minister of Treasury and Finance and is limited to a maximum of 7 business days.

This measure allows the transaction to be suspended temporarily so that the financial intelligence analysis can be completed. When the statutory postponement period of 7 business days expires the process ends in one of two ways:

• Where the suspicion falls away: If the review shows that the transfer rests on a legitimate economic justification, the administrative postponement of transactions becomes null and void automatically at the end of the 7 business days and the restriction on the account is lifted.
• Where the matter passes to the judicial stage: If the suspicion is confirmed or a need for further review arises, the file is referred to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. At this stage the restriction ceases to be an administrative act and turns into a judicial protective measure.

The situation right holders meet most often in practice is that the bank account is still not open for use even though the statutory period of 7 business days has expired. This does not mean that the administrative postponement period has been extended; indeed, the law contains no provision allowing the 7-business-day period to be extended. This picture indicates that the legal source of the restriction has changed, that is, that the administrative measure has given way to a judicial seizure order.

Once the source of the restriction has changed, persisting with applications before the administrative authorities (the Bank Compliance Unit or MASAK) results in the requests being rejected without the merits being examined. From the moment the matter passes to the judicial stage, the counterparty is not the administrative authorities but the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office conducting the investigation and the Criminal Judgeship of Peace that gave the decision.

3- When Does Seizure of an Account by a Prosecutor’s or Judge’s Decision Arise in Turkey?

Where the financial analysis carried out by MASAK ends in confirmation of the suspicion of laundering or of financing terrorism, or where the judicial investigation authorities are notified directly, the administrative restriction on the account turns into a seizure order, which is a judicial protective measure.

a. What Is the Legal Basis of Seizure in the Money Laundering Offence in Turkey?

One of the points most often confused in practice and in the legal literature is the direct statutory basis of judicial seizure in the money laundering offence.

• The catalogue offence limitation in CCP Art. 128: In paragraph 2 of Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, headed “Seizure of immovable property, rights and receivables” , the catalogue offences in which immovable property, rights and receivables may be seized are listed exhaustively as a closed list. The offence of “Laundering of Assets Derived from Crime” under TPC Art. 282 does not appear in the catalogue in that paragraph.
• The bridging provision (Law No. 5549, Art. 17): The legal basis on which bank accounts and assets may be seized in the money laundering offence is Article 17 of Law No. 5549. By expressly providing that, where there is strong suspicion that the offences of laundering and of financing terrorism have been committed, a protective measure may be applied in accordance with the procedure in CCP Art. 128, this article sets the judicial mechanism in motion.

b. Who Can Apply a Judicial Seizure Measure in Turkey?

In the judicial seizure measure applied under CCP Art. 128, the deciding authority and the procedure are subject to the following rules.

• Only a judge can order a seizure: Under paragraph nine of CCP Art. 128, only a judge can order a seizure under the provisions of that article; in the investigation stage the competent authority is the Criminal Judgeship of Peace. (Legislative history: By the amendment made in 2016 by Article 25 of Law No. 6763, the earlier requirement of “a unanimous decision by the High Criminal Court” was repealed.)
• The prosecutor’s temporary power of seizure arises not from CCP Art. 128 but from Law No. 5549, Art. 17/2: Specifically for the offences of laundering and of financing terrorism, where delay is prejudicial, the public prosecutor may also issue a written seizure order. A seizure carried out on the prosecutor’s order is submitted for the approval of the competent judge within 24 hours; the judge also gives a decision within 24 hours. If the judge does not approve it, the measure lapses at once. This exception applies only to the offences covered by Law No. 5549; no such power is given to the prosecutor in the catalogue offences of CCP Art. 128 itself.
• The mandatory report requirement (CCP Art. 128): Before a seizure order can be given, it is mandatory to obtain a report on the value obtained from the offence from, as relevant, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, the Capital Markets Board, the Financial Crimes Investigation Board, the Treasury and the Public Oversight, Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority. The report is prepared within three months at the latest; where special reasons require it, this period may be extended on request for a further two months. This requirement, overlooked in practice, is a concrete ground of objection where a seizure order has been given without such a report.

c. Comparison of General Seizure (CCP Art. 128) with the Cybercrime Regime (CCP Art. 128/A)

The protective measure and its conditions differ fundamentally according to the nature of the offence alleged in the file:

4. Why Is It Important to Identify the Source of the Restriction in Turkey?

The most basic strategic mistake that causes loss of rights, irreparable waste of time and an unnecessary burden of legal fees and litigation costs in practice is turning to legal remedies at random without identifying the legal source of the restriction applied to the bank account.

A bank restriction, an administrative postponement and a judicial seizure measure are each subject, in the Turkish legal system, to a separate branch of the judiciary and to entirely different procedural rules.

a. What Legal Risks Arise from Applying to the Wrong Authority in Turkey?

Where the legal source is wrongly diagnosed, the attitude the authorities applied to will take, and the consequences that follow, are these:

• Going to the criminal or administrative courts over a bank compliance restriction: Where an objection is made to the Criminal Judgeship of Peace, or an action for annulment is brought before the Administrative Court, over a restriction arising from the bank’s internal risk policy while there is as yet no administrative or judicial decision, the authorities give a procedural rejection for lack of jurisdiction or lack of legal interest.
• Bringing an action before the Administrative Court against a judicial seizure order: Where an action is brought before the Administrative Court against a judicial seizure measure imposed by the Criminal Judgeship of Peace or on the order of the public prosecutor’s office, the administrative courts reject the file with a decision of lack of jurisdiction as to the judicial route. Meanwhile the 7-day judicial objection periods under CCP Art. 128/A or CCP Art. 128 are missed.

b. How Can the Legal Basis of a Bank Account Restriction Be Found Out in Turkey?

The first and most critical step for a party who cannot reach their account, or whose transfer has not gone through, is to request an official/written notification showing the nature and the basis of the restriction:

1. A written request petition: An official petition addressed to the bank branch and to the Head Office Compliance Unit should be submitted asking whether the restriction arises from the bank’s internal compliance policy, from a postponement decision of the Minister of Treasury and Finance (Law No. 5549, Art. 19/A) or from the decisions of a judicial authority (the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office / the Criminal Judgeship of Peace).
2. The limit of confidentiality and mandatory information sharing: Under Article 4/2 of Law No. 5549 the bank cannot disclose whether it has filed a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR). It must, however, give the information whether there is a decision of a criminal court/prosecutor’s office over the account (an investigation number or a court case/miscellaneous file number). Sharing this information is a natural requirement of the right of defence under Article 36 of the Constitution.
3. Proof of the mandatory time limits: Submitting the request in writing and obtaining a document registration number ensures that, in any later action for annulment, objection or full remedy (compensation) action, the dates of the application and the mandatory time limits (for example the date of learning) can be proved beyond doubt.

HOW DOES A MASAK REVIEW OF MONEY COMING FROM ABROAD PROCEED IN TURKEY?

A money transfer from abroad being caught by supervision and the restriction process that follows take shape in five main stages that follow one another in a chain within the financial system.

1. Execution of the Transfer and the Correspondent Bank Check in Turkey

Funds sent from abroad are not transferred directly to the recipient bank in Turkey. The transfer is passed on through one or more correspondent banks on the SWIFT or SEPA networks.

• Correspondent banks may stop the funds within the framework of international sanctions lists (OFAC, EU and UN sanctions), money laundering risks and their own internal compliance policies.
• Even if the sending party sees the money leave their account, the transfer may be being held pending in the correspondent bank chain.

2. The Bank Compliance Unit Review in Turkey

When the funds reach the recipient bank in Turkey, the bank’s Compliance Unit filters the transaction with automatic algorithms. If the customer’s known income profile does not match the amount of the transfer, or the description of the transaction is inadequate, the system raises an alert.

• At this stage the account holder is contacted through internet banking, e-mail or by telephone and asked about the nature of the transaction.
• The wording “your transaction is being reviewed” or “awaiting compliance unit approval” on the mobile banking screen points to this phase.

3. The Request for Source Documents and the Written Statement in Turkey

The bank’s request for the legal documents showing the economic basis of the money (a contract, an invoice, a title deed, a customs declaration, a tax certificate and so on) is the most critical stage, and it decides the fate of the process under Turkish law.

• The first written petition and index of documents submitted to the bank at this phase forms the backbone of the file.
• Contradictory or inadequate statements given here cause the bank to draw up a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) and pass the file to MASAK and to the judicial authorities.

4. A Temporary Transaction Restriction or a Postponement Decision in Turkey

Where the supporting documents submitted do not remove the suspicion in the eyes of the bank’s Compliance Unit, a restriction is applied to the account or to the transfer.

• It takes the form of an administrative restriction by the bank based on its own service agreement,
• a 7-business-day postponement decision of the Minister of Treasury and Finance (Law No. 5549, Art. 19/A),
• the 48-hour suspension of the account given to the bank in cybercrime cases (CCP Art. 128/A), or
• a judicial seizure order of the Criminal Judgeship of Peace (CCP Art. 128).

5. The Defence, Objection and Legal Solution Stage in Turkey

Once the legal source of the restriction applied has been identified, the appropriate legal remedies are used.

• An administrative objection is filed before the bank’s Compliance Unit, an action for annulment before the Administrative Court, an objection to the seizure before the Criminal Judgeship of Peace or a request for lifting to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office.
• Where the process passes to the judicial dimension, access to the investigation file and the conduct of a single, integrated defence strategy in line with the principles of criminal law are essential.

An important procedural note: Not all 5 of these stages have to occur in every case. In files where the source documents requested at the second and third stages are submitted in the proper sequence, consistently and in full, the process ends positively at stage 3; the restriction is lifted and the funds pass into the account without the file ever reaching the MASAK postponement or judicial seizure stage.

WHICH DOCUMENTS CAN BE SUBMITTED AS SOURCE DOCUMENTS IN A MASAK EXAMINATION IN TURKEY?

The success of the answer given to a source document (Source of Funds / Wealth) request made, in Turkey, by the banks’ Compliance (Compliance) Units or by MASAK depends on an exact match between the economic justification of the income and the documents submitted as to dates, amounts, currency and party details. Any inconsistency between the documents submitted directly increases the risk of a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR).

1. Salary and Self-Employment Income in Turkey

In evidencing personal employment income obtained from abroad, the basic aim is to prove the continuity of the relationship between the parties and that the payment rests on a taxed/lawful job. The tax dimension of salaries received from abroad should also be assessed separately, and documents consistent with the declaration and taxation position of the income in Turkey should be submitted.

2. Commercial and Export-Related Transfers in Turkey

In inbound transfers of a commercial nature, the existence of an actual movement of goods or services must be documented in a way that fits the foreign exchange and customs legislation. In transfers made within the scope of foreign companies’ activities in Turkey, it must also be shown clearly with documents whether the payment was made directly by the parent company or through the foreign company’s branch in Turkey.

3. Inheritance, Gift and Family Transfers in Turkey

In gratuitous transfers, money passing within the scope of inheritance law in Turkey and transfers of assets within the family, setting out the legal character of the source of the assets, documenting ownership and the transfer of the inheritance and evidencing the status of heir and the family tie with official records all matter in the reviews that banks and financial institutions may carry out.

4. Transfers from Property Sales and Investments in Turkey

In movements of funds in the nature of a transfer of ownership or a capital market return, official registration documents and company decisions taken within the scope of Turkish corporate law come to the fore. In transfers made on behalf of a company, the type of the company, the power of representation and signature and the company decisions on which the payment rests must be consistent with one another.

Where amounts are brought in to acquire property in Turkey, the transactions and documents relating to the transfer of the property under Turkish real estate law must be consistent as between the justification for the transfer and the subsequent land registry transaction. On this point the rules on the regime for foreigners acquiring immovable property in Turkey must be taken into account.

WHICH MISTAKES SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN A MASAK EXAMINATION IN TURKEY?

The following conduct not only leads to the MASAK investigation process being prolonged but also carries the risk of giving rise to a separate criminal liability:

• Making a False or Incomplete Statement in Turkey

A false statement about the origin of the funds does not end the review; on the contrary, where the statement contradicts the documents, it turns the suspicion into a concrete fact. Submitting a forged document in support of the statement may also lead to a separate investigation for the offence of forgery of an official or private document under Turkish law.

• A Contradiction Between the SWIFT Description and the Statement in Turkey

The wording in the description field of the SWIFT message is the first and often the only justification the bank sees. A contradiction between that wording and the written statement given later is treated under Turkish law on its own as a fact that strengthens the suspicion.

The contradiction met most often in practice is that the description field contains a general term such as “loan” or “gift” while a service fee is declared afterwards. In such a case, explaining the contradiction later is far harder than giving a consistent description from the outset. For this reason, agreeing the content of the description field with the sender before the transfer takes place makes a large part of any later defence effort unnecessary.

• Drawing Up a Backdated Contract in Turkey

Contracts drawn up after the transfer and presented as if they bore an earlier date are one of the irregularities most easily detected in practice in Turkey. A comparison made against the notarial certification date, the electronic signature time stamp, the accounting records and the counterparty’s records reveals the inconsistency at once. Submitting such a document damages the credibility of the defence as a whole.

• Splitting the Transfer into Parts (Structuring) in Turkey

Breaking a transfer into many small transactions in order to reduce the amount does not avoid the review. This pattern of conduct is defined in compliance software and monitoring systems as an independent risk indicator and triggers a more intensive review than a single high-value transfer.

• Leaving the Bank’s Letter Unanswered in Turkey

Leaving a request for information and documents unanswered does not result in the restriction lapsing automatically. On the contrary, because the suspicion cannot be dispelled, it increases the likelihood that the file will pass to the judicial authorities. Even where an answer cannot be given within the period, a written application requesting extra time must be made.

• Giving the Explanation Only Verbally in Turkey

A verbal explanation given at a bank branch leaves no record in the file with any evidential value. At later stages it becomes impossible to prove what explanation the account holder gave and on what date.

This is not merely a practical piece of advice. In its settled case law the Constitutional Court states that Article 35 of the Constitution covers “the guarantee that the owner will be afforded the opportunity to put forward effectively, before the responsible authorities, their defence and objections that the interference was applied unlawfully, arbitrarily or unreasonably”. The effectiveness of the defence depends first of all on its having been put on record. For this reason every explanation must be made in writing and with a delivery record, in a way that can be proved as to date and content.

HOW LONG DOES A MASAK REVIEW AND A BANK ACCOUNT BLOCK LAST IN TURKEY?

For a MASAK investigation the statutory framework is relatively short. The postponement under Article 19/A of Law No. 5549 is limited to seven business days and the suspension of the account under CCP Art. 128/A to forty-eight hours.

In practice, by contrast, a bank account freeze is seen to leave the account unusable for far longer. The reason for this is not an extension of the statutory period but a change in the legal source of the restriction. If the file has passed to a judicial authority by the time the administrative postponement period expires, the frozen bank account now continues as a seizure measure, and for seizure the law lays down no period in the nature of an upper limit. From this point on, what determines the length is the course of the investigation.

That the period is not unlimited is the most important safeguard in this field. The Ayşe Sabahat Gencer judgment of the Plenary of the Constitutional Court, application no. 2018/34950, dated 20/10/2022 (Official Gazette: 11/01/2023-32070) sets out this criterion clearly.

In the case that gave rise to the judgment, the amount of a participation fund at a bank transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund was blocked as a measure by an administrative decision based on the provisions of Banking Law No. 5411, and this restriction continued for a period exceeding five years and four months (24/11/2016 – 4/4/2022). Although the judgment does not concern a MASAK block directly, the proportionality criterion it sets out applies to all administrative measures over assets under Turkish law. The Constitutional Court stated that, for measures placed on people’s assets to be regarded as proportionate, the measure must have a reasonable justification and, in addition, the reasons justifying the continuation of those decisions must also be set out. In the Court’s view it is also essential that the measure does not become disproportionate because of the length of the period.

In that case no fault attributable to the applicant could be established in the prolonging of the measure, nor could any justification be put forward making it reasonable to exceed the review period laid down in the legislation. For this reason the Constitutional Court concluded that the measure imposed an excessive individual burden on the applicant and that the right to property had been violated.

The practical value of this judgment is that the continuation of a bank account restriction cannot be justified indefinitely by the reasoning of the first decision. The authority maintaining the measure may be asked to set out the justification for maintaining it separately, and a failure to review that justification is in itself a ground of violation. In practice this criterion, which favours the account holder, cannot be used because it is mostly not raised.

HOW IS A RESTRICTION ON A BANK ACCOUNT LIFTED IN TURKEY?

Placing a restriction on a bank account is a legal act that directly limits the right to property as a result of MASAK measures under Law No. 5549, suspicious transaction reports, tax debts or judicial/administrative investigations. Lifting these restrictions or making good the loss of rights requires, depending on the basis of the act, different legal routes to be exhausted, such as an administrative application, an action for annulment before the administrative courts, an objection to the judicial authorities or an individual application to the Constitutional Court.

• The Written Administrative Application Route in Turkey

The first and usually most effective route under Turkish law is a written application in which the source-of-funds documents are submitted in full. The application must set out clearly the economic justification for the transfer, the relationship between the parties and the connection between the documents. Submitting the documents with an index and stating separately which fact each document proves shortens the length of the review considerably.

• The Right to Bring an Action for Annulment Before the Administrative Courts in Turkey

The Minister’s postponement decision based on Article 19/A is an administrative act and is subject to review by the administrative courts. Under Article 7 of Administrative Jurisdiction Procedure Law No. 2577, headed “Time limit for bringing an action”, where no separate period is laid down in a special law, the time limit for bringing an action before the Council of State and the administrative courts is 60 days. As a rule the period starts on the day following the date of written notification.

Because the seven-business-day postponement period is short, in practice this route is mostly used after the measure has ended. Even so, a finding that the act was unlawful can be decisive for later claims for compensation.

• The Objection Process Before the Criminal Judgeship of Peace

Where the bank account restriction rests on a seizure order applied through Article 17 of Law No. 5549, the review takes place before the criminal courts. Within the framework of the objection remedy laid down in Article 267 and the following articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an objection may be made against the judge’s decision. In the objection, instead of abstract statements, the documents showing the origin of the funds and the fact that the reasons requiring the measure to continue have ceased to exist must be set out concretely.

• Individual Application to the Constitutional Court

Where the ordinary legal remedies have been exhausted and the bank account restriction continues for an unreasonable period, an individual application may be made alleging a violation of the right to property guaranteed by Article 35 of the Constitution. The Plenary judgment of the Constitutional Court referred to above shows that this route is not an abstract possibility and that the time criterion is applied in practice.

• A Claim for Compensation for an Unjustified Measure in Turkey

Where the measure is found to be unlawful, compensation for the loss suffered may arise. In the judgment referred to above, the Constitutional Court treated compensation as an effective remedy for making good the consequences of the violation and awarded non-pecuniary damages. The basis of the claim and the party against whom it is made change according to whether the measure is administrative or judicial in nature; this distinction is decisive in choosing the compensation route.

DOES RECEIVING MONEY FROM ABROAD CONSTITUTE A MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCE IN TURKEY?

Receiving money from abroad does not in every case lead to a review and does not create a suspicion of money laundering. Although this is the most common source of anxiety during the review process, it is mostly misunderstood. The offence of laundering is laid down in Article 282 of Turkish Penal Code No. 5237, headed “Laundering of assets derived from crime” , and two basic conditions must be met for it to arise.

• What does the predicate offence condition mean?: The asset that forms the subject of the offence must derive from an offence carrying a minimum penalty of six months’ imprisonment or more. For an asset that does not derive from a predicate offence, no money laundering offence arises. For this reason, documenting a transfer that rests on a legitimate economic relationship removes the material element of the offence from the outset.
• Why is the specific intent condition decisive?: The judgment of the Criminal General Assembly of the Court of Cassation, case no. 2015/172, decision no. 2018/435, dated 16.10.2018 concerns in essence the power of the Ministry of Treasury and Finance to join a public prosecution brought for the offence of laundering and to appeal against the verdict; the judgment also sets out the structure of the offence in detail. According to the statement of reasons for the article quoted in the judgment, the offence is one with alternative acts and the two alternative acts are distinguished from one another: As regards taking the assets out of the country the intent of the perpetrator is regarded as sufficient, while as regards subjecting the assets to various transactions what is decisive is the aim pursued during those transactions; here the purpose of concealing the illegitimate origin of the assets or of creating the impression that they were obtained by legitimate means is required. In the same judgment the Criminal General Assembly emphasised that the legal interest protected by the offence is to enable the investigation and prosecution authorities to reach the assets obtained from predicate offences and that the offence being placed in the “Offences Against the Judiciary” section reflects that choice.

When these two conditions are assessed together, it is clear that the act of receiving money from abroad does not in itself constitute an offence under Turkish law. What is decisive is the source of the money and the purpose of the transaction. Focusing the review on these two points means that the defence must also be built on them. If the allegation of a predicate offence is based, for example, on fraud, whether the elements of the offence of fraud are made out must also be discussed separately.

WHY IS LAWYER SUPPORT IMPORTANT IN A MASAK INVESTIGATION IN TURKEY?

A MASAK investigation is conducted in an extremely technical field where administrative law, criminal procedure law, banking legislation and Turkish tax law intersect. This interdisciplinary structure of the process turns expert legal support from a choice into a practical necessity.

The following four main risks point to the irreparable losses of rights most often met during a MASAK review under Turkish law:

• The first statement binds every later stage: The first written explanation given to the bank forms the main backbone of the investigation even if the file passes to the judicial authorities. Correcting a statement given in haste that does not fully match the documents is very hard, because it is treated as a contradiction. Building the first statement in full harmony with the supporting documents decides the fate of the process.
• An application to the wrong authority causes a loss of time: Where the source of the restriction is not identified correctly, the applications made are rejected for lack of jurisdiction or lack of legal interest without the merits being examined. Meanwhile the 60-day time limit for bringing an action before the administrative courts and the mandatory time limits in the judicial objection remedy keep running.
• Failure to raise the constitutional criterion on the length of the measure: The duty “to set out concretely the reasons justifying the continuation of the measure”, emphasised in the Constitutional Court’s Ayşe Sabahat Gencer judgment, is not applied by the authorities of their own motion if the person concerned does not raise it in the proper form. In long-running restrictions, raising this constitutional criterion is essential both for having the block lifted and for compensation for an unjustified measure.
• The need to assess the criminal and tax consequences together: Once the suspicion of laundering has been dispelled, a cross-border transfer can become the direct subject of a tax review in Turkey. It is essential that the laundering and tax dimensions be dealt with within a single, integrated defence strategy that does not contradict itself. Where the process is followed from abroad, online legal consultancy mechanisms can be used.

In conclusion, what is decisive in a transfer that becomes the subject of a MASAK investigation in Turkey is not the amount of the money but whether its source can be shown beyond doubt with documents. Where the statements given at every stage of the process are fully consistent with one another and with the supporting documents submitted, this both speeds up the lifting of the restriction and removes the risk of the process turning into a criminal investigation. For this reason, working with a specialist lawyer in MASAK review processes under Turkish legislation is extremely important for the correct exercise of legal rights.